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ABSTRACT 
Executive compensation has attracted much attention as it is exacerbating the agency 
conflicts. This study extends prior research by examining the influence of corporate 
governance practice on executive compensation by listed companies in Nigeria, a 
country that is characterized by low investor protection rights, weak enforcement and 
compliance mechanism that is very much different from the developed markets.   
Specific attention is paid to the role of multinational companies‘ ownership.  The data 
was from 215 company-year observations for the period 2009 to 2013.  The time 
period coincides to the two years before and two years after the publication of the 
Code of Corporate Governance for Public Companies in Nigeria 2011 (CG Code 
2011).  The fixed-effects regression was used for testing the study‘s hypotheses.  The 
result shows there is no significant difference between the executive compensation of 
the multinational companies and those of the domestic companies.  However, the 
executive compensation after the publication of CG Code 2011 was higher than that 
before its publication.  Further, the findings indicate that board attributes (board size, 
board composition, Chief Executive Officer (CEO) duality, gender diversity, 
compensation committee, and compensation committee independence) do not 
constrain CEO from extracting higher compensation in Nigerian Listed Companies 
(NLCs).  The independence of compensation committee shows significant positive 
association with executive compensation.  The ownership structure (CEO ownership, 
directors‘ ownership, and blockholders ownership) do not substitute for effective 
monitoring of the executives.  However, the study shows multinational companies‘ 
ownership to be negatively related to executive compensation. Finally, the study 
results indicate that there are latent weaknesses in the internal corporate governance 
mechanism operational in NLCs.  This result has implication for regulators of 
Nigeria‘s capital market, investors, board of directors, company management, 
researchers and other company stakeholders. 
 
Keywords: executive compensation, corporate governance, multinational companies, 
ownership structure. 
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ABSTRAK 
Pampasan eksekutif telah menarik banyak perhatian kerana ia memburukkan lagi 
konflik agensi. Kajian ini merupakan lanjutan daripada penyelidikan lalu dengan 
mengkaji pengaruh amalan tadbir urus korporat ke atas pampasan eksekutif yang 
dilakukan oleh syarikat-syarikat yang disenaraikan di Nigeria, iaitu sebuah negara 
yang mempunyai ciri-ciri perlindungan hak-hak pelabur yang rendah, penguatkuasaan 
dan mekanisme pematuhan yang lemah yang sangat berbeza daripada pasaran negara 
maju. Perhatian khusus diberikan kepada peranan pemilikan syarikat-syarikat 
multinasional. Data yang digunakan untuk penyelidikan ini adalah daripada 215 
syarikat bagi tempoh 2009 hingga 2013. Tempoh masa tersebut adalah bertepatan 
dengan dua tahun sebelum dan dua tahun selepas penggunaan Kod Tadbir Urus 
Korporat bagi Syarikat Awam di Nigeria 2011 (CG Kod 2011). Kesan tetap regresi 
digunakan untuk menguji hipotesis kajian. Hasil dapatan menunjukkan tidak terdapat 
perbezaan yang signifikan di antara pampasan eksekutif syarikat-syarikat 
multinasional dan syarikat-syarikat tempatan. Walau bagaimanapun, pampasan 
eksekutif selepas penggunaan Kod CG 2011 adalah lebih tinggi berbanding sebelum 
penggunaannya. Di samping itu, penemuan menunjukkan bahawa ciri-ciri  lembaga 
pengarah (saiz lembaga pengarah, komposisi lembaga pengarah, dualiti Ketua 
Pegawai Eksekutif (CEO), kepelbagaian gender, jawatankuasa pampasan, dan 
kebebasan jawatankuasa pampasan) tidak mengekang CEO daripada mengaut hasil 
pampasan yang lebih tinggi dalam Syarikat Tersenarai Nigeria (NLCS). Kebebasan 
jawatankuasa pampasan menunjukkan hubungan positif yang signifikan dengan 
pampasan eksekutif. Struktur pemilikan (pemilikan CEO, pemilikan pengarah, dan 
pemilikan pemegang taruh) tidak menggantikan pemantauan yang berkesan  ke atas 
pengarah eksekutif. Walau bagaimanapun, kajian menunjukkan bahawa pemilikan 
syarikat-syarikat multinasional mempunyai hubungan yang negatif dengan pampasan 
eksekutif. Akhir sekali, hasil kajian menunjukkan bahawa terdapat kelemahan yang 
tersembunyi dalam mekanisme tadbir urus korporat dalaman yang beroperasi di 
NLCS. Keputusan ini memberikan implikasi kepada pengawal selia pasaran modal 
Nigeria, pelabur, lembaga pengarah, pengurusan syarikat, penyelidik dan pemegang 
taruh syarikat lain. 
 
Kata kunci: pampasan eksekutif, tadbir urus korporat, syarikat-syarikat 
multinasional, struktur pemilikan.  
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CHAPTER ONE 
INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1 Background of the Study   
The diffused nature of shareholders in large complex organizations and the 
requirement for managerial skills to enable the firm to perform optimally and 
efficiently have made the professional managers to take full control of the day-to-day 
management of the company (Fama & Jensen, 1983b; Ghosh, 2006).  As a result of 
the separation of ownership and control, the managers (agents) will not always make 
decisions that will be advantageous to the shareholders (principals) because of their 
conflicting risk preferences (Jensen & Meckling, 1976).  It is this conflicting interest 
that is addressed as the agency problem.  It is how to maintain a symbiotic and 
efficient principal-agent relationship so as to minimize the agency conflicts and 
reduce the agency costs that executive compensation was devised. 
 
Executive compensation has been conjectured to mitigate the principal-agent problem 
as Jensen and Murphy (1990b) maintain that this problem could be resolved through 
proper executive compensation policy of the firm.  Agency theory posits that once it 
is optimally contracted it will align the interest of the managers with those of the 
shareholders thus mitigating the agency conflict and reducing the agency loss (cost) 
(Elsaid & Davidson, 2009; Fama & Jensen, 1983b; Jensen & Meckling, 1976; Jensen 
& Murphy, 1990b).  After several decades of study by scholars (Barkema & Gomez-
Mejia, 1998; Gomez-Mejia & Wiseman, 1997) from different academic disciplines 
such as accounting (Core, Holthausen, & Larcker, 1999), economics and finance 
(Jensen & Murphy, 1990b), management (Gomez-Mejia & Wiseman, 1997), and law 
The contents of 
the thesis is for 
internal user 
only 
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